We study standard monetary-policy rules with inflation-rate targets and either interest-rate or money-supply instruments using a flexible-price, perfect-foresight model. We focus mainly on interest-rate rules, but the results for money-supply rules are analogous. A locally-unique target equilibrium always exists. There are also below-target equilibria (BTE) with inflation below target and constant or asymptotically approaching or eventually reaching a below-target value. Liquidity traps are neither necessary nor sufficient for BTE. Such equilibria can also arise if monetary policy keeps the interest rate above a lower bound. We construct monetary-policy rules that preclude BTE. All are non-monotonic and discontinuous in current inflation. Each implies a difference equation in inflation. Some of these difference equations are continuous, but others are not. They are all non-monotonic and non-differentiable at a point. We argue that Japan's difficulties in the 1990s were probably the result of a stabilization problem rather than an indeterminacy problem.
Introduction
In this paper we discuss a price-level indeterminacy problem caused by a lower bound on the (nominal) interest rate. The lower bound may arise either because of the behavior of (private) agents or because of monetary policy. For generality and relevance, our analysis is conducted in terms of the inflation rate instead of the price level. 1 In our terminology, a model exhibits (inflation-rate) indeterminacy if it has multiple equilibria.
Determinacy in flexible-price models is of both theoretical and practical interest. As regards theory, price-level determinacy is a standard topic. Furthermore, in models with synchronized price contracts, agents must be able to determine what expected inflation would be under price flexibility in order to set their contract prices. As regards practice, the Japanese experience with deflation and zero short-term interest rates makes it more urgent to ascertain whether the existence of multiple equilibria is more than a theoretical curiosum.
We illustrate, modify, and extend recent analysis of the indeterminacy problem using a perfect-foresight, superneutral model with flexible prices which may have a liquidity trap. As conventionally defined, a liquidity trap is a region of the money-demand function in which bonds and money are perfect substitutes so that open-market operations in bonds cannot lower the nominal interest rate any further. 2 In our model, a liquidity trap may arise at a zero or at a strictly positive interest rate.
The indeterminacy problem considered in this paper is distinct from the well-known stabilization problem highlighted by Keynes. 3 A lower bound, such as a conventional liquidity trap, can keep the nominal interest rate from being reduced as much as necessary to meet stabilization objectives, at least for a while. 4 Many have argued that Japan faced just such a stabilization problem 1 Of course, inflation-rate determinacy and price-level determinacy are linked. If the inflation rate (defined as the percentage change in the price level between today and yesterday) is determined and yesterday's price level is known, then today's price level is determined.
2 McCallum (2001) refers to a 'liquidity trap situation' as a situation in which 'the (usual) interest rate instrument is immobilized'. Svensson (2001) refers to a liquidity trap as a situation with a binding zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. Krugman (1998) refers to a liquidity trap as a situation where 'monetary policy loses its grip because the nominal interest rate is essentially zero [and] the quantity of money becomes irrelevant because money and bonds are essentially perfect substitutes'. Our definition is the same as Krugman's except that, like Sargent (1987) among others, we explicitly allow for a liquidity trap at a positive interest rate.
3 Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a) make particularly clear the distinction between the two kinds of problems. 4 For example, suppose there is a temporary negative demand shock in an economy with for several years beginning in the mid-1990s. Recently, the indeterminacy problem has received much attention. Models with standard interest-rate rules or money-supply rules and a locally unique steady-state target equilibrium (T E) for the inflation rate may have additional equilibria. To be more precise, there may be multiple equilibrium paths along which the inflation rate is always below target and is constant or either asymptotically approaches or eventually reaches a below-target value. 5 Others have referred to these equilibria as "deflationary-trap equilibria" or "liquidity-trap equilibria". 6 We prefer to call them below-target equilibria (BT E) because they need not involve deflation and can arise without a liquidity trap.
It is useful to summarize what we do. We present integrated derivations of the central results regarding indeterminacy given the existence of a lower bound on the interest rate. 7 We distinguish clearly between a lower bound that arises because agents are in a liquidity trap and one that arises because of monetary policy. It may be surprising to some that a liquidity trap is neither necessary nor sufficient for BT E.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001c) mention an interest-rate rule that precludes BT E. Under this rule the interest rate responds only to current inflation. We present an alternative interest-rate rule that we find somewhat less unusual that also precludes BT E. This rule involves responses to both current and expected future inflation. It is asymmetric: the interest rate responds more strongly to expected future inflation if the current inflation rate is below the target rate. Each of the two rules implies a difference equation in inflation that has implications for uniqueness. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001c) noticed that for uniqueness the implied difference equation one-period nominal wage contracts, flexible prices, a liquidity trap at a zero nominal interest rate, and strict targeting of a zero inflation rate. Suppose the shock is large enough that a negative expected real interest rate is required for zero inflation. Expected future inflation is zero. Because of the liquidity trap, the nominal interest rate cannot fall below zero, so the inflation objective cannot be achieved.
5 A 1999 version of Woodford (2003) cited by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001a) contains an explanation of the possible existence of BTE with both interest-rate rules and money-supply rules. In Woodford (2003) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001c) the inflation rate may asymptotically approach a below-target steady state; in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001a) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003b) it may eventually reach a below-target steady state.
6 Eggertsson and Woodford (2003a , 2003b ) use deflationary-trap, but Benhabib, SchmittGrohe, and Uribe (2001a , 2001c Since our model has flexible prices and exhibits superneutrality, a lower bound can give rise to only nominal indeterminacy. However, using a model with sticky prices, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001c) show that a lower bound can give rise not only to nominal indeterminacy but also to real indeterminacy as distinguished by McCallum (2001) . must be non-monotonic. What no one has noticed, as far as we know, is that it must also be non-differentiable at a point. We also show that indeterminacy problems and their possible solutions under money-supply rules are analogous to those under interest-rate rules.
In the next section we lay out our model and discuss two specific moneydemand functions. Section 3 is a presentation of some results regarding indeterminacy with interest-rate rules. We discuss interest-rate rules that imply uniqueness in section 4. In section 5, we provide examples to illustrate that money-supply rules have implications for indeterminacy and uniqueness analogous to those of interest-rate rules. Concluding remarks are provided in section 6.
2 The model
Agents
Our model economy is populated by a continuum of agents each of which acts simultaneously as a consumer and a producer. For simplicity, we assume that the product market is perfectly competitive, that prices are flexible, and that agents have perfect foresight. The problem of each agent is to find the
subject to the following period budget and positivity constraints:
Period utility is increasing in consumption, weakly increasing in real (money) balances m t , and decreasing in output. 8 The agent takes as given the money price of goods (P t ) and the gross nominal interest rate (I t ) earned on a bond held from period t to period t + 1, and chooses holdings of two nominal financial assets, money (M t ) and bonds (B t ) as well as consumption (C t ) and output (Y t ). According to the period budget constraint, nominal income from production in this period plus nominal money balances and bond holdings inclusive of interest from last period must equal tax payments T t plus the sum of consumption and money and bond holdings for this period. In addition, each agent and, therefore, agents as a group are subject to a no-Ponzi-game condition:
lim
where M t + B t is their net (nominal) financial assets in period t.
To simplify exposition, in sections 2 -5 we express the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate, and the inflation rate in gross terms and refer to them as 'the interest rate', 'the real interest rate', and 'the inflation rate' respectively. In the introductory and concluding sections, we refer to the net nominal interest rate as 'the interest rate' in order to facilitate comparison of our results to those of others.
Three necessary conditions for an optimum are
where
is the (backward looking) gross inflation rate. A fourth necessary condition (the transversality condition) is that (3) hold with equality
Informally, since the marginal utility of consumption is always positive, it cannot be optimal for the present value of agents' 'end of horizon' net financial assets to be strictly positive. The first order conditions have been written as equilibrium conditions: Y t has been set equal to C t as it must be in equilibrium since there is no government spending, and desired asset stocks have been set equal to actual asset stocks. The four equilibrium conditions (4), (5), (6), and (7) reduce to the Fisher equation, the money market equilibrium condition, the output determination equation, and the transversality condition:
where R ≡ 1 β > 1 is the constant gross real interest rate andC is the constant flexible-price value of consumption. Given that both R and Π t+1 are positive, it follows from (8) that I t > 0. In turn, (9) implies that U 0 (C) > V 0 (m t ), so depending on the functional form of V 0 (m t ) there may be a lower bound on m t that is greater than zero. Since U 0 (C) > 0 and V 0 (m t ) ≥ 0, (9) implies I t ≥ Ω ≥ 1, where Ω is the lower bound on I t implied by V 0 (m t ). Since R > 1 and and Ω, respectively.Our main focus is on the possible existence of belowtarget equilibria (BT E). We define BT E as weakly increasing or decreasing paths for inflation and the interest rate along which they are always below Π * and I * respectively, and are either constant at, asymptotically approach, or eventually reach values represented by Π BT E and I BT E , respectively, where I * > I BT E = RΠ BT E ≥ Ω. The implications of monetary policy for determinacy depend not only on the specification of monetary policy but also on the specification of fiscal policy.
9 Using the budget deficit (inclusive of interest payments), fiscal policy determines the total amount of nominal government bonds outstanding, D t . Using open-market operations, monetary policy determines whether these bonds are held by the monetary authority as a match for the money supply, M t , or directly by the public, B t . The consolidated government balance sheet implies that D t = M t + B t . This paper is devoted to the analysis of determinacy under alternative monetary-policy rules. Therefore, we assume that fiscal policy does not determine the price level because it is conducted so that (11) holds for any path of I t , subject to the constraint that D t is bounded away from 9 A landmark analysis of the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy is Leeper (1991) ; more recent analyses include Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) . zero. That is, we assume that fiscal policy is Ricardian everywhere according to the definition of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (1998).
As an example, take a class of fiscal policies under which there is a constant gross growth rate (Γ) for total government bonds:
where Γ = 1 is the case of a balanced-budget policy. Such fiscal policies and the transversality condition (11) taken together have implications for the possibility of BT E. Consider a candidate steady-state BT E in which the interest rate is constant at I BT E . The path I t = I BT E ∀ t can be a steadystate equilibrium only if
Therefore, if Γ ≥ I BT E , fiscal policy precludes such a path. With our parameterization, Γ < I BT E is a necessary condition for fiscal policy to be consistent with steady-state BT E and hence to be Ricardian everywhere. 10 Of course, there are many other parameterizations of fiscal policy which are consistent with the existence of BT E.
Money demand and lower bounds on the interest rate
In order to have versions of the model with and without a liquidity trap, we consider two particular specifications of money demand. Under both specifications the gross nominal interest rate has a lower bound (possibly one). Equation (9) implies
10 The class of fiscal policies for which I * > Γ > I BT E is especially interesting. It is clear from equation (13) that this class precludes BT E for any monetary policy. Using the terminology of Woodford (2001) , these fiscal policies are "locally Ricardian" in the neighborhood of I * but are "locally non-Ricardian" in the neighborhood of I BT E . As shown in Alstadheim and Henderson (2004) , a combination of a member of this class with a standard interest-rate rule is sufficient to insure that Π * is the unique equilibrium value for the inflation rate. These observations suggest that BT E may not be a matter for concern in OECD countries. Most, if not all, of these countries run positive but relatively small government deficits on average so their fiscal policies may preclude BT E. This possibility is yet another reminder of the importance of analyzing monetary and fiscal policy jointly.
Of course, a lower bound of one for I t implies a lower bound of zero for the net nominal interest rate.
The lower bound Ω may be attainable or unattainable. An attainable lower bound (ALB) for I t represents a liquidity trap as conventionally defined. To model an ALB we assume that the utility of real balances is given by
V 0 ≥ 0 represents the minimum marginal utility of real balances. Equation (14) implies
With an unattainable lower bound (ULB), there is no liquidity trap because the interest rate can always fall a little farther. To model an ULB we assume that the utility of real balances is given by
where V 0 represents the lower limit of the marginal utility of real balances. With this functional form, equation (9) implies
Money-demand functions with an ALB and an ULB are represented in figure 1.
11 In both cases, Ω = 1 if and only if V 0 = 0. At an ALB purchases of bonds with money can not lower the interest rate. With an ULB such purchases can always lower the interest rate, if only by an infinitessimal amount.
From (16) or (18), and I > 0 (from (4)) we know that there exists a minimum level for real money balances denoted by m: 3 Interest-rate rules and BTE
In this section we distill the essence of the central indeterminacy results for interest-rate rules when there is a lower bound on the nominal interest rate. Using our two simple money demand functions, it is easy to show why these results hold with or without liquidity traps. One finding that may be surprising at first is that the BT E steady state can be above the lower bound even if the lower bound is preference-determined. We begin by assuming that monetary policy takes the form of interest-rate rules and consider two examples. The general form of the interest-rate rules is
where Π * is the target-equilibrium (T E) inflation rate andȲ =C is the flexible-price output level. With flexible prices, output is always at its flexibleprice level , Y t =Ȳ , so from now on we omit
. We assume that the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to the inflation rate evaluated at the target inflation rate is greater than one. If Π t = Π * , then I t = I * . Until stated otherwise, we assume that the interest-rate rule is differentiable everywhere above the lower bound, that it is at least weakly increasing in the inflation rate and that the interest rate has a lower bound, either a preference-determined lower bound or a policy-determined lower bound. A preference-determined lower bound might exist because of a liquidity trap. A policy-determined lower bound might exist, for example, because the monetary authority wants to keep money market funds economic.
12 Under these assumptions, interestrate rules are associated with two steady-state equilibria: a T E with Π t = Π * and a BT E, where Ω/R ≤ Π BT E < Π * and Ω ≤ I BT E < I * .
A preference-determined lower bound
First, consider the case of an interest-rate rule under which the interest rate may go all the way to the preference-determined lower bound, Ω ALB , associated with an ALB money-demand function:
12 For these funds to survive, there must be some spread between the market rates they earn and the deposit rates they pay as noted by Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) . 13 In this sense, the rule (20) is similar to the one used in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2000) and in the appendix of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001a) . This rule (20) is globally (weakly) increasing in the inflation rate, and the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to the inflation rate in the strictly increasing part is λ > 1.
14 We refer to this case as the liquidity-trap case. First, we consider the strictly increasing part of the interest rate rule. In this part, the interest-rate rule (20), the Fisher equation (8), and I * = RΠ * imply a difference equation in Π t :
It is clear that there is a steady-state equilibrium in which inflation is equal to Π * . This equilibrium is locally unique. The slope of the difference equation is given by
The difference equation is locally unstable at Π t = Π * since its slope is greater than one at that point. It might appear that there is another steady-state equilibrium at Π t = 0. However, this candidate equilibrium is precluded because it implies I t < Ω ALB . Now, we consider the part of the interest rate rule in which the interest rate is at its lower bound, Ω ALB . If the interest rate is at Ω ALB , the inflation rate is determined by the Fisher equation (8) together with I t = Ω ALB instead of by (21). That is, the inflation rate is at its lower bound:
Therefore, the difference equation implied by the interest rate rule has the form shown in figure 2:
It starts above the 45
and cuts this line from below at the T E. It must cut the 45
• a second time at
For inflation rates 14 We use an interest-rate rule of the form (20) so that the inflation-rate term in the strictly increasing range is directly comparable to the current inflation-rate term in the money-supply rule (35). 15 For figure 2, Π * = 1.025, Ω ALB = 1.001, 1/R = 0.975, and λ = 2.
above the lower bound the difference equation can be rewritten
This equation implies the difference equation is below the 45
The list of equilibria for Π 0 ≤ Π * is
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It may not be immediately apparent from this listing just how many equilibria there are. Along any path on which Π 0 < Π * , the inflation rate eventually reaches
. At the same time I t reaches its liquidity-trap value, Ω ALB , at which the levels of the nominal and real money supplies are indeterminate.
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Let the liquidity trap be reached in period n at price level P n , given a particular initial P 0 . There is an infinity of equilibria associated with each initial P 0 ∈ h0, Π * P −1 i. Once the liquidity trap is reached, the set of possible paths for M k , k ≥ n includes all paths for which
∈ [m, ∞i, k ≥ n since agents are indifferent between money and bonds.
In the absence of further assumptions, there would also be an infinity of explosive equilibrium paths. If Π 0 > Π * , the inflation rate would follow a divergent path. Such divergent paths have been referred to as speculative hyperinflations, for example, by Rogoff (1983, 1986) , who have discussed ways of precluding them. Throughout this paper we assume that paths with ever increasing inflation are precluded in some way. and below Π * . 17 The initial inflation rate is not constrained by the lower bound Ω ALB /R. The reason is that the constraint on the inflation rate is implied by the Fisher equation in combination with the interest rate given by the interest-rate rule. The Fisher equation has no implications for the initial price level or the inflation rate P0 P−1 = Π 0 , but it has implications for the inflation rate P 1 P0 . Hence, Π 1 ≥ Ω ALB /R. 18 Otherwise, the nominal money supply is determined by the nominal interest rate and the money-demand function, given the unique inflation rate associated with the T E.
For the sake of comparison, we briefly consider the case of an interest-rate peg in which λ = 0 and the difference equation in figure 2 is a horizontal line. Suppose it is announced that I t will equal I * in period 0 and all future periods. The Fisher equation (8), implies that I * would be associated with Π * from period 1 on. However, this interest-rate rule would not pin down the initial inflation rate. There would be a continuum of equilibria, indexed by the initial inflation rate Π 0 ∈ h0, Π * ]. The situation is different if the monetary authorities specify the initial level of the nominal money supply in addition to the interest-rate peg: the initial inflation rate is determinate because there is a unique level of real balances associated with I 0 = I * .
A policy-determined lower bound
Now consider interest-rate rules designed to keep the gross nominal interest rate from falling below a policy-determined lower bound, Λ, that may be above Ω. The policy-determined lower bound may be attainable, Λ ALB , or unattainable, Λ ULB . For example, with the interest-rate rule
the policy-determined lower bound is attainable. This rule and the difference equation in inflation that it implies are identical to the ones considered in the last subsection except that the lower bounds on the interest rate and inflation are determined by policy, not by preferences. The rule can be implemented with both ALB money demand (Λ ALB ≥ Ω ALB ) and with ULB money demand (Λ ALB > Ω ULB ). The entire list of possible equilibria is given by items 1 through 4 in the last subsection except that Λ ALB replaces Ω ALB everywhere. In contrast to the liquidity trap case, when Π t reaches Λ ALB R along a BT E path, real balances and nominal balances are uniquely determined.
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It is useful to consider a rule that is very similar to the continuously dif- 19 Consider the family of interest-rate rules given by
With this family, the strictly increasing part of the difference equation for Π t begins at the point
• line in (Π t+1 , Π t ) space. If Υ = 1, the implied difference equation is qualitatively identical to the one plotted in Figure 2 .4 of Woodford (2003) . ferentiable rules used in the seminal papers on the existence of BT E:
This rule has a policy-determined lower bound that is unattainable. 20 It can be implemented with both ALB and ULB money-demand functions. The interest rate rises with inflation, and the response is greater the higher is inflation.
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As before, the elasticity of the interest rate with respect to the inflation rate at Π * is λ > 1. With the rule (27), there must be two steady-state equilibrium inflation rates: one is Π * and the other is Π BT E which is below Π * and above Λ ULB /R but which may or may not involve deflation. Combining the rule (27) with the Fisher equation (8) yields a difference equation in inflation of the form plotted in figure 3 :
This equation is a convex function that has a lower bound of
and that crosses the 45
• degree line from below at the T E where its slope is greater than one:
We employ the rule (27) because it is directly comparable to the other interest-rate rules and the money-supply rule (35) used in this paper. Rule (27) is also used by Evans and Honkapohja (2005) , who assume that Λ ULB = 1. 21 That is
For figure 3, Π * = 1.025, 1/R = 0.975, Λ ULB = 1.02, and λ = 2.
that is, Π * is an unstable steady-state equilibrium. In addition its slope approaches zero as Π t approaches 0 from above and rises continuously with Π t :
Therefore, it must intersect the 45 • line a second time at a point below Π * represented by Π BT E where its slope is less than one. 23 That is, Π BT E is a stable equilibrium with deflation (Λ ULB /R < Π BT E < 1), stable prices (Λ ULB /R < Π BT E = 1), or inflation (1 < Π BT E ) as in figure 3 . There is a continuum of admissible equilibria, indexed by Π 0 . Each Π 0 ≤ Π * is associated with one of the two possible steady-state inflation rates.
4 Interest-rate rules that imply uniqueness
As might be expected there are interest-rate rules that imply uniqueness.
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The question is this: Are they too unusual to be taken seriously? In this section, we first consider a rule of the type mentioned by Benhabib, SchmittGrohe, and Uribe (2001c), hereafter BSGU. They argue that such rules are too unusual to be taken seriously. We then present a rule that we regard as being somewhat less unusual. Our analysis yields a pair of conditions that are necessary for uniqueness.
An unusual rule
Consider the following unusual rule of the type mentioned by BSGU:
23 If λ = 1 there would be a unique steady state at Π t = Π * , but there would be multiple initial equilibrium inflation rates because all paths that start below the target rate would approach it.
24 Π 0 can be lower than The rule has two unusual properties: it is non-monotonic in the current inflation rate, and it is discontinuous. Although BSGU point out that discontinuity is not necessary for uniqueness, they assume it in constructing their example of a non-monotonic rule, and we assume it for comparability. This rule is similar to the one described in section 3.2 except that the interest rate is pegged at e I > I * instead of at the policy-determined lower bound value Λ ALB when I *
It is feasible with both ALB and ULB money demands, since it never calls for I t = Ω.
The difference equation in the inflation rate that follows from (31) and the Fisher equation (8) is illustrated in figure 4 . 26 It inherits discontinuity and non-monotonicity from the interest-rate rule. Consider a situation where the inflation rate is so low that if I were given by I * ¡ Π Π * ¢ λ it would be less than or equal to the lower bound, Ω. In such a situation, I t jumps up to e I. In the next period, the inflation rate must be higher than the target inflation rate given the Fisher equation and the fact that e I > I * t . But such a path is not a possible solution, because it implies that the inflation rate increases without limit. Hence, the economy cannot start out on a path of declining inflation.
It is worth remarking that if the interest-rate rule under consideration were credible the economy would always be at the unique target equilibrium so that a high interest rate at low inflation rates would never be observed. Of course, the rule may not be credible precisely because it has quite unusual properties.
A somewhat less unusual rule
As an example of a rule that also implies uniqueness but is somewhat less unusual, we suppose that
Recently, there have been several studies of rules involving response to future inflation. Among them are the following: Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) estimate rules with response to future inflation and find that they fit data from the U.S., Germany, and Japan quite well; Batini and Haldane (1999) investigate rules with response to future inflation using a model calibrated using U. K. data; Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001b) write down in general form an interest-rate rule with responses to both current and future inflation but report results for only the extreme cases in which there is a response to only one or the other.
We assume that the rule is asymmetric: the response to future inflation is stronger when current inflation is below target. This feature is somewhat unconventional but nonetheless quite plausible. We argue below that our rule is somewhat less unusual than the rule (31) Combining equation (32) with the Fisher equation (8) and using I * = RΠ * , give a first-order difference equation in the inflation rate,
If λ and η are chosen so that α < 0 if Π t < Π * and α > 1 if Π t ≥ Π * , the unique solution for Π t is Π * . We think our rule is somewhat less unusual than the rule (31). It is true that both rules are non-monotonic and discontinuous in current inflation. However, consider what happens when I falls below I * . Rule (31) involves a discrete increase in I at I * (or, more generally, at some point below it) no matter what the value of Π t+1 while our rule involves a discrete increase only if Π t+1 > Π * . If Π t+1 < Π * there is a discrete decrease in I. As an example of a rule that satisfies the restrictions stated above, suppose that
• If Π t < Π * , then η > 1 and λ > 1, so that α < 0.
• If Π t ≥ Π * , then η = 0 and λ > 1, so that α > 1.
For parameter values that satisfy these restrictions, the difference equation for inflation (33) has the form shown in figure 5 . 27 It is non-monotonic, continuous, and non-differentiable at Π t = Π * . Π * is a unique steady-state equilibrium, and Π 0 = Π * is the only equilibrium 28 . If the initial inflation rate is in the interval Π 0 ∈ h0, Π * i, the economy embarks on a path with everincreasing inflation. The part of the difference equation that applies when Π 0 ∈ h0, Π * i implies Π 1 > Π * , and the inflation rate continues to increase because the part that applies when Π t ∈ [Π * , ∞i is now relevant. Thus, as 27 For figure 5, λ = 2, Π * = 1.025, and Ω = 1.001. η = 1.5 when Π t < Π * , and η = 0 otherwise. 28 All it takes for equation (33) to be associated with a unique steady-state T E is that α < 0 when Π t < Π * and α > 1 when Π t > Π * . One could, for example, let η = 0 so that there was zero response to future inflation, and vary λ to meet these requirements.
pointed out by BSGU, it is clear that necessary conditions for uniqueness do not include discontinuity in the implied difference equation.
As stated by BSGU, non-monotonicity of the implied difference equation is a necessary condition for uniqueness. What has gone unnoticed, as far as we know, is that non-differentiability of the implied difference equation is also a necessary condition. 29 In establishing our claims, we refer frequently to a constraint on the inflation difference equation implied by a lower bound on the nominal interest rate. The nominal interest rate must always be at or above its lower bound (I t = RΠ t+1 ≥ Ω ≥ 1), and hence the path of inflation is also bounded from below. That is, Π t ≥ Ω R for t > 0. Only Π 0 is not constrained by the lower bound.
30 Strict inequalities apply in the case of an unattainable lower bound.
First, consider the necessity of the non-monotonicity of the implied difference equation in inflation. This equation cannot be monotonically increasing, start out above the 45
• line (as it must because of the constraint), and cross the 45
• line only once and from below (as it must for uniqueness). Now, consider the necessity of non-differentiability of the implied difference equation. Suppose that the difference equation is differentiable. Suppose that it cuts the 45
• line from below at Π * so that there is a locally unique steady state. Because of differentiability, the equation is continuous. Because of the constraint and continuity, the difference equation must cross the 45
• line a second time at a value below Π * but above
, so there is a multiplicity of equilibria. Alternatively, if the only contact between the difference equation and the 45
• line is a point of tangency at Π * , that point is the only steady state. In this case the difference equation must lie above the 45
• line everywhere except at the tangency point because of the constraint. If the difference equation is flat or increasing to the left of the tangency point, it follows that there is a multiplicity of equilibria because any inflation rate to the left of the tangency point can be the first point on a path to that point. If the only contact between the difference equation and the 45
• line is at the minimum of the difference equation and the minimum is Π * , then Π * is a globally unique steady state, and the difference equation cannot be differentiable there. We are left with two possibilities for uniqueness: either, the difference equation may be non-differentiable at the target inflation rate but continuous as for example in figure 5, or the difference equation may be discontinuous and non-differentiable at any point strictly below Π * as, for example, in figure 4. 29 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to the importance of nondifferentiability. 30 See footnote 17.
The difference equation can be non-differentiable and discontinuous, respectively, only if the interest-rate rule is, since the other equation involved (the consumption Euler equation I t = RΠ t+1 ) is continuous and differentiable. Although non-monotonicity and non-differentiability of the difference equation are necessary for determinacy, they are not sufficient. Non-monotonicity cannot be sufficient. For example, the non-monotonic quadratic equation
2 would cross the 45
• line twice and would not be associated with uniqueness. Non-differentiability cannot be sufficient either. For example, the non-differentiable difference equations implied by the interestrate rules (20) and (26) in section 3 do not rule out indeterminacy.
Money-supply rules, BTE, and Uniqueness
Much attention has been devoted to indeterminacy problems associated with interest-rate rules. It is worth emphasizing that indeterminacy is every bit as much of a problem with money-supply rules. As might be expected, similar problems have similar solutions: money-supply rules analogous to the interestrate rules of the preceding section imply uniqueness. For brevity, we illustrate these points only for ALB money demand, but the results for ULB money demand are essentially the same. We use an example, but the points are more general.
Consider the following money-supply rule written in terms of real balances:
where m * is defined in equation (37) . This rule nests the special cases we want to discuss. Setting δ = 0 yields a simple rule with response only to current inflation. This rule is comparable to the simple interest-rate rule of section 3. As in the preceding subsection, we assume that the rule is asymmetric with a stronger response to future inflation when current inflation is below target.
The expression for ALB money demand in equations (16) and the Fisher equation (8) imply an expression for inflation
all of which are assumed to be positive. We explain how to obtain the difference equation implied by the most general version of equation (35) and then consider special cases. When m t ≤ m, using the money-supply rule (35) to eliminate m t in (5) implies a difference equation in Π t that is not displayed. The slope of the implied difference equation at the T E is dΠ t+1
First, we consider the special case in which δ = 0. In this case, the difference equation is given by
The form of this equation is illustrated in figure 6 . 31 It is monotonic and has an attainable lower bound of
Under the assumptions in equation (38), it has a slope greater than one at the T E. It follows that there must be two steady-state equilibria. When m t ≤ m, there is a locally-unique steady-state T E.
32 When m t > m, there is a stable below-target steady state at Π ALB .
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Therefore, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. The difference equation (39) implied by the money-supply rule (35) is analogous to the difference equation (24) implied by an interest-rate rule (20), and the list of equilibria is the same for both. Now, we consider the case in which the money supply responds to expected future inflation (F < δ) when Π t ≥ Π * . In this case, there is a unique equilibrium with the asymmetric money-supply rule.
As an example, suppose that 31 For figure 6, τ = 1, Π * = 1.025, 1/R = 0.975, and δ = 0. Also, m = 2.5 and Ω = 1.001. This example is a case of m > 0 because Θ =Ū 0 − m − V 0 = −1.501 < 0. 32 This steady state exists under two weak conditions that we assume are met. One condition is m * > 0. From (37) this condition is always met for Θ < 0 and is met for Θ > 0 if the target interest rate is smaller than the maximum possible interest rate obtained by setting m t = 0 in equation (16) • If Π t < Π * , then τ = 1 and δ = 1.
• If Π t ≥ Π * , then τ = 1 and δ = 0.
For this example, the difference equation for inflation has the form shown in figure 7 . 34 It is non-monotonic, continuous, and non-differentiable at the T E. It follows from equation (38) that the slope of the difference equation is negative to the left of the T E and greater than one to the right of it. Π * is a unique steady-state equilibrium, and Π 0 = Π * is the only equilibrium. If Π 0 6 = Π * , the economy would embark on an inadmissible path with everincreasing inflation and, from equation (37), ever-decreasing real balances.
Conclusions
Under many specifications of monetary policy, standard models exhibit pricelevel indeterminacy. That is, they have multiple equilibria that include both a locally-unique steady-state target (inflation-rate) equilibrium (T E) and multiple below-target equilibria (BT E), equilibria in which the inflation rate is always below target and is constant or eventually reaches or asymptotically approaches a below-target value.
Rules with either the interest rate or money supply as instruments are consistent with price-level indeterminacy when there is a lower bound on the nominal interest rate. There may be such a lower bound because of a conventionally-defined liquidity trap in which bonds and money are perfect substitutes at either a positive or zero nominal interest rate. Also, there may be a lower bound even if there is no liquidity trap for one of two reasons. First, money demand may imply a lower bound on the interest rate which is approached asymptotically. Second, an interest-rate rule may keep the interest rate above a policy-determined lower bound.
The above results all apply when the interest rate or the money supply responds monotonically to eliminate deviations in the current inflation rate from its target value. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001c) mention an interest-rate rule that precludes BT E but argue that it is too unusual to be of interest. We present an unconventional but plausible interest-rate rule that also precludes BT E and that, in our view, is somewhat less unusual. It is asymmetric: the interest rate responds more strongly to expected future 34 For figure 7, τ = 1, Π * = 1.025, 1/R = 0.975, and δ = 0 when m t < m * and δ = 1 otherwise. Also, m = 2.5 and Ω = 1.001. This example is a case of m > 0 because
inflation if the current inflation rate is below the target rate. Each of these rules implies its own difference equation in inflation. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001c) noticed that for uniqueness the implied difference equation must be non-monotonic but not necessarily discontinuous. What no one has noticed, as far as we know, is that it must also be non-differentiable at some inflation rate less than or equal to the target rate. If it is non-differentiable at the target inflation rate, it can be continuous. Otherwise, it must be discontinuous at the point at which it is non-differentiable. We show that indeterminacy problems and their possible solutions are analogous for money-supply rules and interestrate rules. It is not yet clear whether the existence of BT E is an important problem or a curiosum. Some have argued that BT E are of little interest for theoretical reasons. McCallum (2001 McCallum ( , 2003 uses his 'minimum state variable' criterion as one way of determining which equilibria are of interest. In terms of our model, he shows that the locally-unique T E meets this criterion while the multiplicity of BT E equilibria associated with the below-target steady state, often referred to as 'sun-spot' equilibria, do not. Both McCallum (2001 McCallum ( , 2003 and Evans and Honkapohja (2006) use stability under a particular type of learning as an alternative criterion. In terms of our model, they show that the T E is stable under learning while the BT E are not. Although these theoretical arguments are attractive, not all analysts are completely convinced by them.
There is another, more practical reason for focusing on the target equilibrium. The combination of any of a range of small deficits with a standard interestrate or money-supply rule guarantees that the T E is the unique equilibrium because the deficit precludes BT E.
35 This observation suggests that BT E may not be a matter for concern in most OECD countries. Most of these countries run positive but relatively small government deficits on average so their fiscal policies may preclude BT E. This possibility provides another illustration of the importance of analyzing monetary and fiscal policy jointly.
For some policies, appropriateness depends crucially on whether one is concerned about stabilization or indeterminacy, but, for others, it does not. Raising the target inflation rate can help solve a stabilization problem of the type mentioned in section 1 by raising expected future inflation, thereby lowering the real interest rate. 36 However, in our model this policy cannot help solve an indeterminacy problem because a wide range of target inflation rates are consistent with indeterminacy. In contrast, no matter which type of problem one is trying to solve, there is a strong case for a more aggressive response 35 See footnote 10. 36 See, for example, Krugman (1998). to inflation when it is below target. It has been stressed that more aggressive easing reduces the chances of having a stabilization problem in which policymakers must rely on less familiar instruments with more uncertain effects. 37 We have shown that responding more aggressively to expected inflation when current inflation is below target makes it possible to avoid multiple equilibria.
It might be argued that Japanese experience from the mid-90s until recently fits the description of a BT E, that is, a bad draw from a set of multiple equilibria. Although this argument cannot be rejected out of hand, there are at least two reasons to question it and to argue instead that the Japanese experience is better characterized as a stabilization problem. First, the collapses of the stock and land markets and the accompanying bank crises were big negative demand shocks. Second, arguably Japan has come out of its slump partly because the Bank of Japan announced and carried out its zero-interest-rate and quantitative easing policies that increased expected inflation. We have argued that policies that increase inflation expectations are helpful in solving a stabilization problem but not an indeterminacy problem. For whatever reason, most analysts have concluded that what the Japanese really faced was not an indeterminacy problem but a stabilization problem. 
